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This paper develops an elementary theory of global supply chains. We consider a world economy
with an arbitrary number of countries, one factor of production, a continuum of intermediate goods,
and one final good. Production of the final good is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique
free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages specialize
in later stages of production. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity
differences are a source of comparative advantage among nations. Using this simple theoretical framework,
we offer a first look at how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations.
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One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth
points it, a fth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head
requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to
whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper;
and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about
eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by
distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or
three of them.Adam Smith (1776)
1 Introduction
Most production processes consist of a large number of sequential stages. In this regard the
production of pins in late eighteenth century England is no di¤erent from todays produc-
tion of tee-shirts, cars, computers, or semiconductors. Today, however, production processes
increasingly involve global supply chains spanning multiple countries, with each country spe-
cializing in particular stages of a goods production sequence, a phenomenon which Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi (2001) refer to as vertical specialization.
This worldwide phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention among policy makers, busi-
ness leaders, and trade economists alike. On the academic side of this debate, a large
literature has emerged to investigate how the possibility to fragment production processes
across borders may a¤ect the volume, pattern, and consequences of international trade; see
e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Yi (2003), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In
this paper, we propose to take a rst look at a distinct, but equally important question:
Conditional on production processes being fragmented across borders, how does technologi-
cal change, either global or local, a¤ect di¤erent countries participating in the same supply
chain? In other words, how does vertical specialization shape the interdependence of nations?
From a theoretical standpoint, this is not an easy question. General equilibrium models
with an arbitrary number of goods and countries with or without sequential production
rarely provide sharp and intuitive comparative static predictions.1 In order to make progress,
we therefore start by proposing a simple theory of trade with sequential production. We
consider a world economy with multiple countries, one factor of production (labor), and one
nal good. Production is sequential and subject to mistakes, as in Sobel (1992) and Kremer
(1993). Production of the nal good requires a continuum of intermediate stages. At each of
these stages, production of one unit of an intermediate good requires one unit of labor and
one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage. Mistakes occur along the
supply chain at a constant Poisson rate, which is an exogenous technological characteristic
1Ethier (1984) o¤ers a review of theoretical results in high-dimensional trade models.
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of a country. When a mistake occurs at some stage, the intermediate good is entirely lost.
By these stark assumptions, we aim to capture the more general idea that because of less
skilled workers, worse infrastructure, or inferior contractual enforcement, both costly defects
and delays in production are more likely in some countries than in others.
Section 3 describes the properties of the free trade equilibrium in our basic environment.
Although our model allows for any nite number of countries and a continuum of stages,
the unique free trade equilibrium is fully characterized by a simple system of rst-order non-
linear di¤erence equations. This system can be solved recursively by rst determining the
assignment of countries to di¤erent stages of production and then computing the wages and
export prices sustaining that allocation as an equilibrium outcome. In our model, the free
trade equilibrium always exhibits vertical specialization: countries with a lower probability
of making mistakes, at all stages, specialize in later stages of production, where mistakes are
more costly. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity di¤erences
are a source of comparative advantage among nations.
Using this simple model, the rest of our paper o¤ers a comprehensive exploration of
how technological change, either global or local, a¤ects di¤erent countries participating in
the same global supply chain. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of global technological
change. We investigate how an increase in the length of production processes, which we
refer to as an increase in complexity,and a uniform decrease in failure rates worldwide,
which we refer to as standardization, may a¤ect the pattern of vertical specialization
and the world income distribution. Building solely on the idea that labor markets must
clear both before and after a given technological change, we demonstrate that although
both an increase in complexity and standardization lead all countries to move up the
supply chain, they have opposite e¤ects on inequality between nations. While an increase
in complexity increases inequality around the world, standardization benets poor countries
disproportionately more. According to our model, standardization may even lead to a welfare
loss in the most technologically advanced country, a strong form of immiserizing growth.
Section 5 focuses on how local technological change may spill over, through terms-of-trade
e¤ects, to other countries participating in the same supply chain. We consider two forms
of local technological change: (i) labor-augmenting technical progress, which is isomorphic
to population growth; and (ii) a decrease in a countrys failure rate, which we refer to as
routinization. In a world with sequential production, we show that local technological
changes tend to spillover very di¤erently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the
bottom, depending on the nature of technological changes, all countries either move up
or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes in
inequality between nations. At the top of the chain, by contrast, local technological progress
always leads all countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological
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change, inequality between nations may either fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer
countries at the bottom of the chain benet disproportionately more from being pushed into
later stages of production, this is not always true at the top.
Section 6 demonstrates how more realistic features of global supply chains may easily
be incorporated into our simple theoretical framework. Our rst extension introduces co-
ordination costs across countries. Among other things, we demonstrate that a decrease
in coordination costs may lead to overshooting:more stages of production may be o¤-
shored to a small country at intermediate levels of coordination costs than under perfectly
free trade. Our second extension allows for the existence of multiple parts, each produced
sequentially and then assembled, with equal productivity in each country, into a unique nal
good using labor. In this environment, we show that the poorest countries tend to specialize
in assembly, while the richest countries tend to specialize in the later stages of the most
complex parts. Our nal extension allows for heterogeneity in failure rates across di¤erent
stages. In this generalized version of our model, we provide su¢ cient conditions under which
our cross-sectional predictions remain unchanged.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, we draw some ideas from
the literature on hierarchies in closed-economy (and mostly partial-equilibrium) models. Im-
portant contributions include Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), Sobel (1992), Kremer (1993),
Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). As in Sobel (1992) and Kremer
(1993), we focus on an environment in which production is sequential and subject to mis-
takes, though we do so in a general equilibrium, open-economy setup. Models of hierarchies
have been applied to the study of international trade issues before, but with very di¤erent
goals in mind. For instance, Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) use the knowledge
economy model developed by Garicano (2000) to study the matching of agents with hetero-
geneous abilities across borders and its consequences for within-country inequality. Instead,
countries are populated by homogeneous workers in our model.2
In terms of techniques, our paper is also related to a growing literature using assignment or
matching models in an international context; see, for example, Grossman and Maggi (2000),
Grossman (2004), Yeaple (2005), Ohnsorge and Treer (2007), Blanchard and Willmann
(2010), Nocke and Yeaple (2008), Costinot (2009), and Costinot and Vogel (2010). Here, like
in some of our earlier work, we exploit the fact that the assignment of countries to stages
of production exhibits positive assortative matching i.e., more productive countries are
assigned to later stages of production in order to generate strong and intuitive comparative
static predictions in an environment with a large number of goods and countries.
In terms of focus, our paper is motivated by the recent literature documenting the impor-
2Other examples of trade papers using hierearchy models to study within-country inequality include
Kremer and Maskin (2006), Sly (2010), Monte (2010), and Sampson (2010).
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tance of vertical specialization in world trade. On the empirical side, this literature builds
on the inuential work of Hummels, Rappoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi
(2001), and Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005). Our focus on how vertical specializa-
tion shapes the interdependence of nations is also related to the work of Kose and Yi (2001,
2006), Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008), and Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2009) who
study how production sharing a¤ects the transmission of shocks at business cycle frequency.
On the theoretical side, the literature on fragmentation is large and diverse; see Antràs
and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) for a recent overview. Among existing papers, our theoretical
framework is most closely related to Dixit and Grossman (1982), Sanyal (1983), Yi (2003,
2010), Harms, Lorz, and Urban (2009), and Baldwin and Venables (2010) who also develop
trade models with sequential production. None of these papers, however, investigate how
technological change, either global or local, may di¤erentially impact countries located at
di¤erent stages of the same supply chain. This is the main focus of our analysis.
2 Basic Environment
We consider a world economy with multiple countries, indexed by c 2 C  f1; :::; Cg, one
factor of production, labor, and one nal good. Labor is inelastically supplied and immobile
across countries. Lc and wc denote the endowment of labor and wage in country c, respec-
tively. Production of the nal good is sequential and subject to mistakes. To produce the
nal good, a continuum of stages s 2 S  (0; S] must be performed. At each stage, produc-
ing one unit of intermediate good requires one unit of the intermediate good produced in the
previous stage and one unit of labor. For expositional purposes, we assume that interme-
diate good 0is in innite supply and has zero price.3 Intermediate good Scorresponds
to the unique nal good mentioned before.
Mistakes occur along the supply chain at a constant Poisson rate, c > 0, which is an
exogenous technological characteristic of a country. It measures total factor productivity
(TFP) at any given stage of the production process. When a mistake occurs on a unit of
intermediate good at some stage, that intermediate good is entirely lost. Formally, if a rm
from country c combines q(s) units of intermediate good s with q(s)ds units of labor, its
output of intermediate good s+ ds is given by
q (s+ ds) = (1  cds) q (s) . (1)
3Alternatively, one could assume that intermediate good 0can be produced using labor only. In this
situation, the price of intermediate good 0would also be zero since only a measure zero of workers would
be required to perform this measure-zero set of stages. Assuming that intermediate good 0is in innite
supply allows us to avoid discussions of which country should produce this good. Such considerations are
irrelevant for any of our results.
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Note that letting q0 (s)  [q (s+ ds)  q (s)] =ds, Equation (1) can be written as q0 (s) =q (s) =
 c. In other words, moving along the supply chain in country c, potential units of the nal
good get destroyed at a constant rate, c.
For technical reasons, we further assume that if a rm produces intermediate good s+ds,
then it necessarily produces a positive measure of intermediate goods around that stage.4
This implies that each unit of the nal good is produced by a nite, though possibly arbi-
trarily large number of rms. Countries are ordered such that c is strictly decreasing in
c. Thus countries with a higher index c have higher total factor productivity. All markets
are perfectly competitive and all goods are freely traded. p(s) denotes the world price of
intermediate good s. We use the nal good as our numeraire, p (S) = 1.
3 Free Trade Equilibrium
3.1 Denition
In a free trade equilibrium, all rms maximize their prots taking world prices as given and
all markets clear. Prot maximization requires that for all c 2 C,
p (s+ ds)  (1 + cds) p (s) + wcds,
p (s+ ds) = (1 + cds) p (s) + wcds, if Qc (s0) > 0 for all s0 2 (s; s+ ds],
(2)
where Qc (s0) denotes total output at stage s0 in country c. Condition (2) states that the
price of intermediate good s+ ds must be weakly less than its unit cost of production, with
equality if intermediate good s + ds is actually produced by a rm from country c. To see
this, note that the production of one unit of intermediate good s+ ds requires 1= (1  cds)
units of intermediate good s as well as labor for all intermediate stages in (s; s + ds]. Thus
the unit cost of production of intermediate good s+ds is given by [p (s) + wcds] = (1  cds).
Since ds is innitesimal, this is equal to (1 + cds)p (s) + wcds.
Good and labor market clearing further require that
PC
c=1Qc (s2) 
PC
c=1Qc (s1) =  
Z s2
s1
PC
c=1 cQc (s) ds, for all s1  s2, (3)Z S
0
Qc (s) ds = Lc, for all c 2 C, (4)
Equation (3) states that the change in the world supply of intermediate goods between
stages s1 and s2 must be equal to the amount of intermediate goods lost due to mistakes in
4Formally, for any intermediate good s + ds, we assume the existence of s2  s + ds > s1 such that if
q (s+ ds) > 0, then q (s0) > 0 for all s0 2 (s1; s2].
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all countries between these two stages. Equation (4) states that the total amount of labor
used across all stages must be equal to the total supply of labor in country c. In the rest of
this paper, we formally dene a free trade equilibrium as follows.
Denition 1 A free trade equilibrium corresponds to output levels Qc () : S  ! R+ for all
c 2 C, wages wc 2 R+ for all c 2 C, and intermediate good prices p () : S  ! R+ such that
conditions (2)-(4) hold.
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness
We rst characterize the pattern of international specialization in any free trade equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages S0  0 < S1 <
::: < SC = S such that for all s 2 S and c 2 C, Qc (s) > 0 if and only if s 2 (Sc 1; Sc].
According to Lemma 1, there is vertical specialization in any free trade equilibrium with
more productive countries producing and exporting at later stages of production. The formal
proof as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in the appendix.5 The intuition behind
Lemma 1 can be understood in two ways. One possibility is to look at Lemma 1 through the
lens of the hierarchy literature; see e.g. Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and Garicano (2000).
Since countries that are producing at later stages can leverage their productivity on larger
amounts of inputs, e¢ ciency requires countries to be more productive at the top. Another
possibility is to note that since new intermediate goods require both intermediate goods
produced in previous stages and labor, prices must be increasing along the supply chain.
Thus intermediate goods produced at later stages are less labor intensive, which makes them
relatively cheaper to produce in countries with higher wages. In our model these are the
countries with higher TFP at all stages. Because of the sequential nature of production,
absolute productivity di¤erences are a source of comparative advantage among nations.6
We refer to the vector (S1; :::; SC) as the pattern of vertical specialization and denote
by Qc  Qc (Sc) the total amount of intermediate good Sc produced and exported by country
5A result similar to Lemma 1 in an environment with a discrete number of stages can also be found in
Sobel (1992) and Kremer (1993).
6In his early work on fragmentation, Jones (1980) pointed out that if some factors of production are
internationally mobile, then absolute advantage may a¤ect the pattern of international specialization. The
basic idea is that if physical capital is perfectly mobile and one country has an absolute advantage in
producing capital services, then it will specialize in capital intensive goods. The logic of our results is
very di¤erent and intimately related to the sequential nature of production. Mathematically, a simple
way to understand why sequential production processes make abolute productivity di¤erences a source of
comparative advantage is to consider the cumulative amount of labor necessary to produce all stages from 0 to
s  S for a potential unit of the nal good. By equation (1), this is equal to ecs which is log-supermodular
in (c; s). This is the exact same form of complementarity that determines the pattern of international
specializatin in standard Ricardian models; see Costinot (2009).
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c. Using the previous notation, the pattern of vertical specialization and export levels can
be jointly characterized as follows.
Lemma 2 In any free trade equilibrium, the pattern of vertical specialization and export
levels satisfy the following system of rst-order non-linear di¤erence equations:
Sc = Sc 1  

1
c

ln

1  cLc
Qc 1

, for all c 2 C, (5)
Qc = e
 c(Sc Sc 1)Qc 1, for all c 2 C, (6)
with boundary conditions S0 = 0 and SC = S.
Lemma 2 derives from the goods and labor market clearing conditions (3) and (4). Equa-
tion (5) reects the fact that the exogenous supply of labor in country c must equal the
amount of labor demanded to perform all stages from Sc 1 to Sc. This amount of labor
depends both on the rate of mistakes c as well as the total amount Qc 1 of intermediate
good Sc 1 imported from country c   1. Equation (6) reects the fact that intermediate
goods get lost at a constant rate at each stage when produced in country c.
In the rest of this paper, we refer to the vector of wages (w1; :::; wC) as the world income
distribution and to pc  p (Sc) as the price of country cs exports (which is also the price
of country c + 1s imports under free trade). Let Nc  Sc   Sc 1 denote the measure of
stages performed by country c within the supply chain. In the next lemma, we show that
the measures of stages being performed in all countries (N1; :::; NC) entirely summarize how
changes in the pattern of vertical specialization a¤ect the world income distribution.
Lemma 3 In any free trade equilibrium, the world income distribution and export prices
satisfy the following system of rst-order linear di¤erence equations:
wc+1 = wc + (c   c+1) pc, for all c < C, (7)
pc = e
cNcpc 1 +
 
ecNc   1 (wc=c) , for all c 2 C, (8)
with boundary conditions p0 = 0 and pC = 1.
Lemma 3 derives from the zero-prot condition (2). Equation (7) reects the fact that
for the cuto¤ good, Sc, the unit cost of production in country c, (1 + cds) pc + wcds,
must be equal to the unit cost of production in country c + 1, (1 + c+1ds) pc + wc+1ds.
Equation (8) directly derives from the zero-prot condition (2) and the denition of Nc and
pc. It illustrates the fact that the price of the last intermediate good produced by country
c depends on the price of the intermediate good imported from country c  1 as well as the
total labor cost in country c.
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Combining Lemmas 1-3, we can establish the existence of a unique free trade equilibrium
and characterize its main properties.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique free trade equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the pattern
of vertical specialization and export levels are given by equations (5) and (6), and the world
income distribution and export prices are given by equations (7) and (8).
The proof of Proposition 1 formally proceeds in two steps. First, we use Lemma 2
to construct the unique pattern of vertical specialization and vector of export levels. In
equations (5) and (6), we have one degree of freedom, Q0, which corresponds to total input
used at the initial stage of production. Since SC is decreasing inQ0, it can be set to satisfy the
nal boundary condition SC = S. Once (S1; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC 1) have been determined,
all other output levels can be computed using equation (1) and Lemma 1. Second, we use
Lemma 3 together with the equilibrium measure of stages computed before, (N1; :::; NC), to
characterize the unique world income distribution and vector of export prices. In equations
(7) and (8), we still have one degree of freedom, w1. Given the monotonicity of pC in w1, it
can be used to satisfy the other nal boundary condition, pC = 1. Finally, once (w1; :::; wC)
and (p1; :::; pC) have been determined, all other prices can be computed using the zero-prot
condition (2) and Lemma 1.
3.3 Discussion
As a rst step towards analyzing how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of
nations, we have provided a full characterization of free trade equilibria in a simple trade
model with sequential production. Before turning to our comparative static exercises, we
briey discuss the cross-sectional implications that have emerged from this characterization.
First, since rich countries specialize in later stages of production while poor countries
specialize in earlier stages, our model implies that rich countries tend to trade relatively
more with other rich countries (from whom they import their intermediates and to whom
they export their output) while poor countries tend to trade relatively more with other poor
countries, as documented by Hallak (2010). Second, since intermediate goods produced in
later stages have higher prices and countries producing in these stages have higher wages,
our model implies that rich countries both tend to import goods with higher unit values, as
documented by Hallak (2006), and to export goods with higher unit values, as documented
by Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), and Hallak and Schott (2010).
Following Linder (1961), the two previous stylized facts have traditionally been ratio-
nalized using non-homothetic preferences; see e.g. Markusen (1986), Flam and Helpman
(1987), Bergstrand (1990), Stokey (1991), Murphy and Shleifer (1997) Matsuyama (2000),
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Fieler (2010), and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009). The common starting point
of the previous papers is that rich countriespreferences are skewed towards high quality
goods, so they tend to import goods with higher unit values. Under the assumption that
rich countries are also relatively better at producing high quality goods, these models can
further explain why rich countries tend to export goods with higher unit values and why
countries with similar levels of GDP per capita tend to trade more with each other.7
The complementary explanation o¤ered by our elementary theory of global supply chains
is based purely on supply considerations. According to our model, countries with similar
per-capita incomes are more likely to trade with one another because they specialize in
nearby regions of the same supply chain. Similarly, countries with higher levels of GDP
per capita tend to have higher unit values of imports and exports because they specialize
in higher stages in the supply chain, for which inputs and outputs are more costly. Note
that our supply-side explanation also suggests new testable implications. Since our model
only applies to sectors characterized by sequential production and vertical specialization,
if our theoretical explanation is empirically relevant, one would therefore expect Linder
e¤ects i.e. the extent of trade between countries with similar levels of GDP per capita
to be higher, all else equal, in sectors in which production processes are vertically fragmented
across borders in practice.
The previous cross-sectional predictions, of course, should be interpreted with caution.
Our theory is admittedly very stylized. In Section 6, we will discuss how the previous results
may be a¤ected (or not) by the introduction of more realistic features of global supply chains.
4 Global Technological Change
Many technological innovations, from the discovery of electricity to the internet, have im-
pacted production processes worldwide. Our rst series of comparative static exercises fo-
cuses on the impact of global technological changes on di¤erent countries participating in
the same supply chain. Our goal is to investigate how an increase in the length of production
processes, perhaps associated with the development of higher quality goods, as well as a uni-
form decrease in failure rates worldwide, perhaps due to the standardization of production
processes, may a¤ect the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution.
7In Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009), such predictions are obtained in the absence of any
exogenous relative productivity di¤erences. In their model, a higher relative demand for high-quality goods
translates into a higher relative supply of these goods through a home-markete¤ect.
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4.1 Denitions
It is useful to introduce rst some formal denitions describing the changes in the pattern
of vertical specialization and the world income distribution in which we will be interested.
Denition 2 Let (S 01; :::; S
0
C) denote the pattern of vertical specialization in a counterfactual
free trade equilibrium. A country c 2 C is moving up (resp. down) the supply chain relative to
the initial free trade equilibrium if S 0c  Sc and S 0c 1  Sc 1 (resp. S 0c  Sc and S 0c 1  Sc 1).
According to Denition 2, a country is moving up or down the supply chain if we can
rank the set of stages that it performs in the initial and counterfactual free trade equilibria
in terms of the strong set order. Among other things, this simple mathematical notion will
allow us to formalize a major concern of policy makers and business leaders in developed
countries, namely the fact that China and other developing countries are moving up the
value chain;see e.g. OECD (2007).
Denition 3 Let (w01; :::; w
0
C) denote the world income distribution in a counterfactual free
trade equilibrium. Inequality is increasing (resp. decreasing) among a given group fc1; :::cng
of adjacent countries if w0c+1=w
0
c  wc+1=wc (resp. w0c+1=w0c  wc+1=wc) for all c1  c  cn 1.
According to Denition 3, inequality is increasing (resp. decreasing) within a given group
of adjacent countries, if for any pair of countries within that group, the relative wage of the
richer country is increasing (resp. decreasing). Since wages correspond to GDP per capita
in our model, this property o¤ers a simple way to conceptualize changes in the world income
distribution.
4.2 Increase in complexity
At the end of the eighteenth century, Adam Smith famously noted that making a pin was
divided into about 18 distinct operations. Today, as mentioned by Levine (2010), making a
Boeing 747 requires more than 6,000,000 parts, each of them requiring many more operations.
In this section we analyze the consequences of an increase in the measure of stages S necessary
to produce a nal good, which we simply refer to as an increase in complexity.8
Our approach, like in subsequent sections, proceeds in two steps. We characterize rst
the changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and second the associated changes in the
world income distribution. Our rst comparative static results can be stated as follows.
8For expositional purposes, we abstract from any utility gains that may be associated with the production
of more complex goods in practice. Our analytical results on the pattern of vertical specialization and the
inequality between nations do not depend on this simplication. But it should be clear that changes in real
wages, which will necessarily decrease after an increase in complexity, crucially depend on it.
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Figure 1: Consequences of an increase in complexity.
Proposition 2 An increase in complexity leads all countries to move up the supply chain
and increases inequality between countries around the world.
The changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution
associated with an increase in complexity are illustrated in Figure 1. The broad intuition
behind changes in the pattern of vertical specialization is simple. An increase in complexity
tends to decrease total output at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain
equal to labor demand, this decrease in output levels must be accompanied by an increase
in the measure Nc of stages performed in all countries. Proceeding by iteration from the
bottom of the supply chain, we can then show that this change in Nc can only occur if all
countries move up.
The logic behind the changes in the world income distribution is more subtle. From
Lemma 3, we know that relative wages satisfy
wc+1
wc
= 1 +
c   c+1
(wc=pc)
, for all c < C. (9)
Thus, wc+1=wc is decreasing in the labor intensity, wc=pc, of country cs export. From the
rst part of Proposition 2, we also know that countries: (i) are performing more stages,
which tends to increase export prices (for a given price of imported inputs); and (ii) are
moving up into higher stages, which tend to have higher export prices (for a given schedule
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of prices). Both e¤ects tend to raise the price of intermediate goods that are being traded,
and in turn, to decrease their labor intensity. This explains why inequality between nations
increases. This e¤ect is reminiscent of the mechanism underlying terms-of-trade e¤ects in a
Ricardian model; see e.g. Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) and Krugman (1986).
From an economic standpoint, equation (9) captures the basic idea that the wage of country
c+1 should increase relative to the wage of country c if and only if c+1 moves into sectors
in which it has a comparative advantage. In our model, since country c + 1 has a higher
wage, these are the sectors with lower labor intensities. In a standard Ricardian model, these
would be the sectors in which country c+ 1 is relatively more productive instead.
There is, however, one important di¤erence between our model with sequential production
and a standard Ricardian model. In our model, the pattern of comparative advantage
depends on endogenous di¤erences in labor intensity across stages. In a standard Ricardian
model, the same pattern only depends on exogenous productivity di¤erences. As we will
see in Section 5.1, this subtle distinction may lead to very di¤erent predictions about the
consequences of technological change on inequality between nations.9
4.3 Standardization
In most industries, production processes become more standardized as goods mature over
time. In order to study the potential implications of this particular type of technological
change within our theoretical framework, we now consider a uniform decrease in failure rates
from c to 
0
c  c for all c 2 C, with  < 1, which we simply refer to as standardization.
The consequences of standardization on the pattern of vertical specialization and the world
income distribution can be described as follows.
Proposition 3 Standardization leads all countries to move up the supply chain and de-
creases inequality between countries around the world.
The consequences of standardization are illustrated in Figure 2. For a given pattern
of vertical specialization, standardization tends to raise total output and, therefore, the
demand for labor at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to
labor demand, this increase in output levels must be partially o¤set by a reduction of output
at earlier stages of production. Hence, poor countries must increase the measure of stages
that they perform, pushing all countries up the supply chain.
9While the previous results emphasize the consequences of an increase in the complexity of production
processes on inequality between nations, it is worth pointing out that Proposition 2 also provides microthe-
oretical foundations for a novel form of skill-biased technological change within nations. In a world with
sequential production, our results demonstrate that the introduction of new stages of production tend to
benet skilled workers disproportionately more, even if new stages are not skill-biased per se.
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Figure 2: Consequences of standardization.
Like in our rst comparative static exercise, the logic behind the changes in the world
income distribution is more subtle. The direct e¤ect of standardization on relative wages is
to decrease inequality: in the extreme case in which  = 0, having a lower rate of mistakes
c does not provide any benet. There is, however, an indirect, general equilibrium e¤ect
associated with changes in the pattern of vertical specialization. To establish that the direct
e¤ect necessarily dominates the indirect one, the basic idea behind our proof is to normalize
the measures of stages performed and export prices by . Under this normalization, stan-
dardization is equivalent to a reduction in complexity: because both tend to reduce output
lost to mistakes, they both require countries to move down the (normalized) supply chain,
which leads to a fall in inequality between countries.10 It is interesting to note that while
standardization and an increase in complexity both cause all countries to move up the supply
chain, they have opposite e¤ects on inequality between nations.
The previous comparative static results are reminiscent of Vernons (1966) product cycle
hypothesis; see also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Antràs (2005). In our model, as
a particular production process becomes more standardized, less productive countries start
performing a broader set of stages. As this happens, our analysis demonstrates that inequal-
10Formally, while Nc rises for poor countries and falls for rich countries, Nc falls for all countries. Hence,
whereas all countries move up the chain, they move down the normalized chain. Under this normalization,
countries: (i) are performing fewer stages, and (ii) are moving down into lower stages. Both e¤ects tend to
lower the normalized price pc of intermediate goods that are being traded, and in turn, to increase their
labor intensity. This explains why inequality between nations decreases.
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ity between nations decreases around the world. Figure 2 also illustrates that although the
direct e¤ect of standardization is to increase output in all countries, welfare may fall in the
most technologically advanced countries through a terms-of-trade deterioration. This is rem-
iniscent of Bhagwatis (1958) immiserizing growth.Two key di¤erences, however, need to
be highlighted. First, standardization proportionately increases TFP in all countries in the
global supply chain, whereas Bhagwatis (1958) immiserizing growth occurs in response to an
outward shift in the production possibility frontier in one country. Second, standardization
proportionately increases TFP at all stages of production, whereas Bhagwatis (1958) im-
miserizing growth occurs in response to an outward shift in the export sector. In our model,
it is the sequential nature of production that makes uniform TFP growth endogenously act
as export-biased technological change in the more technologically advanced countries.11
5 Local Technological Change
Two of the major changes in todays world economy are: (i) the increased fragmentation
of the production process, which Baldwin (2006) refers to as the Great Unbundling;and
(ii) the rise of China and other developing countries, such as India and Brazil. While both
phenomena have been studied separately, we know very little about their interaction. The
goal of this section is to use our elementary theory of global supply chains to shed light on
this issue. To do so, our second series of comparative static exercises focuses on the impact
of labor-augmenting technical progress and routinization in one country and describes how
they spill overto other countries in the same supply chain through terms-of-trade e¤ects.
5.1 Labor-augmenting technical progress
We rst study the impact of labor-augmenting technical progress, which is isomorphic to
an increase in the total endowment of labor, Lc0, of a given country c0. Following the same
two-step logic as in Section 4, the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress can
be described as follows.
Proposition 4 Labor-augmenting technical progress in country c0 leads all countries c < c0
to move down the supply chain and all countries c > c0 to move up. This decreases inequality
among countries c 2 f1; :::; c0g, increases inequality among countries c 2 fc0; :::; c1g, and
decreases inequality among countries c 2 fc1; :::; Cg, with c1 2 fc0 + 1; :::; Cg.
11Like in Bhagwatis original paper, however, it should be clear that immiserizing growth arises in this
environment because of strong complementarities between goods. In our model, producing one unit of
intermediate good always requires one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage and one
unit of labor. This explains why technological changes may have large (and adverse) terms-of-trade e¤ects.
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Figure 3: Consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress in country 3.
The spillover e¤ects associated with labor-augmenting technical progress are illustrated
in Figure 3. The broad intuition behind changing patterns of specialization is simple. An
increase in the supply of labor (in e¢ ciency units) in one country tends to raise total output
at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this
increase in output levels must be accompanied by a decrease in the measure of stages Nc
performed in each country c 6= c0. Proceeding by iteration from the bottom and the top of
the supply chain, we can then show that this change in Nc can only occur if all countries
below c0 move down and all countries above c0 move up. Finally, since the total measure
of stages must remain constant, the measure of stages Nc0 performed in country c0 must
increase.
Changes in the pattern of vertical specialization naturally translate into changes in the
world income distribution. As in Section 4.2, countries at the bottom of the chain are mov-
ing down into lower stages and are performing fewer stages. Both e¤ects tend to decrease
inequality between nations at the bottom of the chain. The non-monotonic e¤ects on in-
equality at the top of the chain reect two conicting forces. On the one hand, countries are
moving up, which tends to increase the price of intermediate goods traded in that region of
the supply chain, and in turn, to decrease their labor intensity. On the other hand, countries
are performing fewer stages, which tends to reduce the price of their exports and increase
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their labor intensity.12
The previous non-monotonic e¤ects stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of standard
Ricardian models and illustrate nicely the importance of modeling the sequential nature of
production for understanding the consequences of technological changes in developing and
developed countries on their trading partners worldwide. To see this, consider a Ricardian
model without sequential production in which there is a ladder of countries with poor coun-
tries at the bottom and rich countries at the top. Krugman (1986) is a well-known example.
In such an environment, if foreign labor-augmenting technical progress leads the richest
countries to move up, inequality among these countries necessarily increases. The reason is
simple. On the one hand, the relative wage of two adjacent countries is equal to their relative
productivity in the cuto¤sector. On the other hand, richer countries are relatively more
productive in sectors higher up the ladder (otherwise they would not be specializing in these
sectors in equilibrium). By contrast, Proposition 4 predicts that as the richest countries
move up, inequality may decrease at the very top of the chain. This counterintuitive result
derives from the fact that the pattern of comparative advantage in a model with sequential
production is not exogenously given, but depends instead on endogenous factor prices. This
subtle distinction breaks the monotonic relationship between the pattern of international
specialization and inequality between nations. Although later stages are necessarily less la-
bor intensive in a given equilibrium, the labor intensity of later stages in the new equilibrium
may be higher than the labor intensity of earlier stages in the initial equilibrium. At the
top of the chain, poorer countries may therefore benet disproportionately more from being
pushed into later stages of production.
5.2 Routinization
We now turn our attention to the consequences of a decrease in the failure rate c0 of a
given country c0, which we refer to as routinization.For simplicity we restrict ourselves to
a small change in c0, in the sense that it does not a¤ect the ranking of countries in terms
of failure rates. The consequences of routinization can be described as follows.
Proposition 5 Routinization in country c0 leads all countries move up the supply chain,
increases inequality among countries c 2 f1; :::; c0g, decreases inequality among countries
c 2 fc0; c0 + 1g, increases inequality among countries c 2 fc0 + 1; :::; c1g, and decreases
inequality among countries c 2 fc1; :::; Cg, with c1 2 fc0 + 1; :::; Cg.
The spillover e¤ects associated with routinization are illustrated in Figure 4. According
to Proposition 5, all countries move up the supply chain. In this respect, the consequences
12Note that since c1 2 fc0 + 1; :::; Cg, the third group of countries, fc1; :::; C   1g, is non-empty if c1 < C,
but empty if c1 = C. We have encountered both cases in our simulations.
16
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1/l3
St
ag
es
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
1/l3
W
ag
es
(S4,S5]
(S3,S4]
(S2,S3]
(S1,S2]
(S0,S1]
w5
w4
w3
w2
w1
C=5, (L1,l1)=(1.29,1.88), (L 2,l2)=(0.76,1.75), (L 3,l3)=(1.62,1.25), (L 4,l4)=(1.07,1.17), (L 5,l5)=(0.70,1.10))
Figure 4: Consequences of routinization in country 3.
of routinization are the same as the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress at
the top of the chain, but the exact opposite at the bottom.
To understand this result, consider rst countries located at the top of the chain. Since
total output of the nal good must rise in response to a lower failure rate in country c0,
countries at the top of the chain must perform fewer stages for labor markets to clear.
By a simple iterative argument, these countries must therefore move further up the supply
chain, just like in Proposition 4. At the top of the chain, the consequences of routinization
for inequality are the same as the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress. The
non-monotonicity with inequality rising among countries c 2 fc0 + 1; :::; c1g and decreasing
among countries c 2 fc1; :::; Cg arises from the same two conicting forces: countries move
up the chain but produce fewer stages.
At the bottom of the chain, the broad intuition behind the opposite e¤ects of labor-
augmenting technical progress and routinization for changes in the pattern of specialization
can be understood as follows. Holding the pattern of vertical specialization xed, labor-
augmenting technical progress in country c0 increases the total labor supply of countries
c  c0, but leaves their labor demand unchanged. Thus labor market clearing requires
countries at the bottom of the chain to reduce the number of stages they perform, to move
down the chain, and to increase their output, thereby o¤setting the excess labor supply at the
top. By contrast, routinization in country c0 increases the total labor demand of countries
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c  c0 (since country c0 now produces more output at each stage), but leaves their labor
supply unchanged. As a result, countries at the bottom of the chain now need to increase
the number of stages they perform, to move up the chain, and to reduce their output in
order to o¤set the excess labor demand at the top. The consequences for inequality follow
from the same logic as in the previous section.13
Our goal in this section was to take a rst stab at exploring theoretically the relationship
between vertical specialization and the recent emergence of developing countries like China.
A key insight that emerges from our analysis is that because of sequential production, local
technological changes tend to spillover very di¤erently at the bottom and the top of the chain.
At the bottom of the chain, depending on the nature of technological changes, countries may
move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes
in the world income distribution within that region. At the top of the chain, by contrast,
local technological progress always leads countries to move up, but even conditioning on
the nature of technological change, inequality between nations within that region may fall
or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benet
disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always
true at the top. In fact, as Figure 4 illustrates, the most technologically advanced countries
may be the only ones losing as all countries move up around the world.
6 Extensions
Our elementary theory of global supply chains is special along several dimensions. First, all
intermediate goods are freely traded. Second, production is purely sequential. Third, stages
of production are identical in all dimensions except the order in which they are performed.
In this section we demonstrate how more realistic features of global supply chains may be
easily incorporated into our theoretical framework.
6.1 Coordination Costs
An important insight of the recent trade literature is that changes in trade costs a¤ect the
pattern and consequences of international trade not only by a¤ecting nal goods trade, but
also by a¤ecting the extent of production fragmentation across borders; see e.g. Feenstra and
Hanson (1996), Yi (2003), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). We now discuss how
13The only di¤erence is that in the middle of the chain, inequality decreases among countries c 2
fc0; c0 + 1g because of the direct e¤ect of a reduction in c0 , which tends to decrease inequality between c0
and c0+1, as seen in equation (9). This force was absent from our previous comparative static exercise since
labor endowments (in e¢ ciency units) did not directly a¤ect zero prot conditions.
18
the introduction of trading frictions in our simple environment would a¤ect the geographic
structure of global supply chains, and in turn, the interdependence of nations.
A natural way to introduce trading frictions in our model is to assume that the likelihood
of a defect in the nal good is increasing in the number of times the intermediate goods used
in its production have crossed a border. We refer to such costs, which are distinct from
standard iceberg trade costs, as coordination costs. Formally, if the production of one
unit of the nal good in a given country involves n international transactions i.e. export
and import at stages 0 < s1  s2  :::  sn < S then the nal good is worthless with
probability 1   n 2 [0; 1]. The case considered in Section 2 corresponds to  = 1. Like in
Section 2, we assume that the nal good is freely traded and use it as our numeraire. Finally,
we assume that all international transactions are perfectly observable by all rms so that
two units of the same intermediate good s may, in principle, command two di¤erent prices
if their production requires a di¤erent number of international transactions. Accordingly,
competitive equilibria remain Pareto optimal in the presence of coordination costs.
The analysis of this generalized version of our model is considerably simplied by the fact
that, in spite of coordination costs, a weaker version of vertical specialization must still hold
in any competitive equilibrium. Let Cu (s) denote the country in which stage s has been
performed for the production of a given unit u. Using the previous notation, the pattern of
international specialization can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 4 In any competitive equilibrium, the allocation of stages to countries, Cu : S ! C,
is increasing in s for all u 2 0; QW Pc2C Qc (S).
According to Lemma 4, for any unit of the nal good, production must still involve vertical
specialization, with less productive countries specializing in earlier stages of production.
This result is weaker, however, than the one derived in Section 2 in that it does not require
Cu () to be the same for all units. This should be intuitive. Consider the extreme case
in which coordination costs are innitely large. In this situation all countries will remain
under autarky in a competitive equilibrium. Thus the same stages of production will be
performed in di¤erent countries. In the presence of coordination costs, one can therefore only
expect vertical specialization to hold within each supply chain, whether or not all chains are
identical, which is what Lemma 4 establishes. Armed with Lemma 4, we can characterize
competitive equilibria using the same approach as in Section 2. The only di¤erence is that
we now need to guess rst the structure of the equilibrium (e.g. some units are produced
entirely in country 1, whereas all other units are produced jointly in all countries) and then
verify ex post that our guess is correct.
Figure 5 illustrates how the structure of competitive equilibria varies with the magnitude
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Figure 5: Consequences of a reduction in coordination costs.
of coordination costs in the two-country case.14 There are three distinct regions. For su¢ -
ciently high coordination costs, all stages are being performed in both countries and there is
no trade. Conversely, for low enough coordination costs, the pattern of vertical specialization
is the same as under free trade. In this region, reductions in coordination costs have no e¤ect
on the pattern of specialization, but raise wages in all countries. The most interesting case
arises when coordination costs are in an intermediate range. In this region, the large country
(country 2) is incompletely specialized, whereas the small country (country 1) is completely
specialized in a subset of stages. As can easily be shown analytically, the set of stages that
are being o¤shored to the small country is necessarily increasing in the level of coordination
costs over that range. Hence starting from autarky and decreasing coordination costs, there
will be overshooting: a broader set of stages will be performed in the poor country at
intermediate levels of coordination costs than under perfectly free trade. This pattern of
overshooting does not arise from coordination failures, heterogeneity in trade costs, or the
imperfect tradability of the nal good, as discussed in Baldwin and Venables (2010). It
simply reects the fact that in a perfectly competitive model with sequential production and
trading frictions, a su¢ ciently large set of stages must be performed in the small country for
rms to nd it protable to fragment production across borders. Accordingly, the larger the
coordination costs, the larger the set of stages being performed in the small country!
14Details about the construction of these competitive equilibria are available upon request.
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Figure 5 also illustrates that sequential production does not hinder the ability of smaller
countries to benet from international trade. On the contrary, smaller countries tend to
benet more from freer trade. In the above example, a decrease in coordination costs either
only benets the small country (for intermediate levels of coordination costs) or a¤ects
real wages in both countries in the same proportional manner (for low enough coordination
costs). Finally, Figure 5 highlights that how many stages of the production process are
being o¤shored to a poor country may be a very poor indicator of the interdependence of
nations. Here, when the measure of stages being o¤shored is the largest, the rich country is
completely insulated from (small) technological shocks in the poor country.
6.2 Simultaneous Production of Multiple Parts and Assembly
Most production processes are neither purely sequential, as assumed in Section 2, nor purely
simultaneous, as assumed in most of the existing literature. Producing an aircraft, for
example, requires multiple parts, e.g. an engine, seats, and windows. These parts are
produced simultaneously before being assembled, but each of these parts requires a large
number of sequential stages, e.g. extraction of raw materials, rening, and manufacturing.15
With this is mind, we turn to a generalization of our original model in which there are
multiple supply chains, indexed by n 2 N  f1; :::; Ng, each associated with the production
of a part. We allow supply chains to di¤er in terms of their complexity, Sn, but for simplicity,
we require failure rates to be constant across chains and given by c, as in Section 2. Hence
countries do not have a comparative advantage in particular parts. Parts are ordered such
that Sn is weakly increasing in n. So parts with a higher index n are more complex.
Parts are assembled into a unique nal good using labor. Formally, the output Yc of the
nal good in country c is given by
Yc = F
 
X1c ; :::; X
N
c ; Ac

,
where F () is a production function with constant returns to scale, Xnc is the amount of
part n used in the production of the nal good in country c, and Ac  Lc corresponds to
the amount of labor used for assembly in country c. Note that the production function
F () is assumed to be identical across countries, thereby capturing the idea that assembly is
su¢ ciently standardized for mistakes in this activity to be equally unlikely in all countries.
Note also that by relabelling each part n as a distinct nal good and the production function
F () as a utility function, with F () independent of Ac, this section can also be interpreted
as a multi-sector extension of our baseline framework.16
15Manufacturing itself, of course, requires a large number of sequential stages.
16More generally, one could interpret the present model as a multi-sector economy with one outside
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In this generalized version of our model, the pattern of international specialization still
takes a very simple form, as the next lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 5 In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages S0  0  S1 
:::  SC = SN such that for all n 2 N , s 2 [0; Sn], and c 2 C, Qnc (s) > 0 if and only if
s 2 (Sc 1; Sc]. Furthermore, if country c is engaged in parts production, Ac < Lc, then all
countries c0 > c are only involved in parts production, Ac0 = 0.
Lemma 5 imposes three restrictions on the pattern of international specialization. First,
the poorest countries tend to specialize in assembly, while the richest countries tend to
specialize in parts production. This directly derives from the higher relative productivity
of the poorest countries in assembly. Second, amongst the countries that produce parts,
richer countries produce and export at later stages of production. This result also held in
Section 3, and the intuition is unchanged. Third, whereas middle-income countries tend to
produce all parts, the richest countries tend to specialize in only the most complex ones.
Intuitively, even the nal stage Sn of a simple part is su¢ ciently labor intensive that high-
wage, high-productivity countries are less competitive at that stage. Viewed through the
lens of the hierarchy literature, the nal output of a simple chain does not embody a large
enough amount of inputs to merit, from an e¢ ciency standpoint, leveraging the productivity
of the most productive countries.
Compared to the simple model analyzed in Section 3, the present model suggests ad-
ditional cross-sectional predictions. Here, trade is more likely to be concentrated among
countries with similar levels of GDP per capita if exports and imports tend to occur along
the supply chain associated with particular parts rather than at the top between part pro-
ducers and assemblers.Accordingly, one should expect trade to be more concentrated
among countries with similar levels of GDP per capita in industries in which the production
process consists of very complex parts.
While cross-sectional predictions are potentially distinct from those of our simple model,
the logic underlying the interdependence of nations is very similar. Since we still have vertical
specialization in equilibrium, the free trade equilibrium remains characterized by a simple
system of non-linear di¤erence equations, akin to the ones presented in Lemmas 2 and 3. It
therefore remains fairly easy to analyze the consequences of technological change. The key
di¤erence between the present environment and the one considered in Sections 4 and 5 is
that the amount of labor allocated to vertical supply chains is now an endogenous variable
that depends on the amount of labor necessary for assembly.
good, that can be produced one-to-one from labor in all countries, and multiple sequentialgoods, whose
production is as described in Section 2. Under this interpretation, Ac would simply be the amount of labor
allocated to the outside good in country c.
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6.3 Heterogeneous Stages of Production
In order to focus attention in the simplest possible way on the novel aspects of an environment
with sequential production, we have assumed that stages of production only di¤er in one
dimension: the order in which they are performed. In practice, stages of production often
di¤er greatly in terms of factor intensity, with some stages being much more skill-intensive
than others. To capture such considerations within our simple theoretical framework, we
now allow failure rates to be an exogenous characteristic of both a stage and a country.
Formally, we assume that mistakes occur at a Poisson rate, c(s), where c(s) is: (i)
strictly decreasing in c, (ii) continuous and weakly increasing in s, and (iii) weakly submod-
ular in (s; c). This last restriction captures the idea that more e¢ cient countries also tend
to be the countries with a comparative advantage in later stages of production. Accordingly,
one can now think of s as a measure of skill intensity in the sense that higher stages are
associated with higher relative productivity in countries with more skilled workers, i.e. those
with lower failure rates at all stages.
As we demonstrate in the appendix, the pattern of international specialization in this
generalized version of our model is still characterized by Lemma 1. Our cross-sectional pre-
dictions are therefore unchanged: there is vertical specialization in any free trade equilibrium,
with more productive countries specializing in later stages of production. The intuition is
simple. Absent any comparative advantage across stages, we know that more productive
countries specialize in later stages of production. When c(s) is submodular, the previous
pattern of international specialization is simply reinforced by the comparative advantage of
more productive countries in later stages.
The basic forces that determine the interdependence of nations remain the same as in
Sections 4 and 5. In particular, one can still show analytically that labor-augmenting techni-
cal progress in country c0 still leads all countries c < c0 to move down the supply chain and
all countries c > c0 to move up, just like in Proposition 4. The analysis of the consequences of
technological change for the world income distribution, however, is more involved as changes
in the measures of stages performed in each country are no longer su¢ cient to predict how
changes in the pattern of vertical specialization a¤ect inequality between nations.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed an elementary theory of global supply chains. The key
feature of our theory is that production is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique
free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages
specialize in later stages of production. Because of the sequential nature of production,
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absolute productivity di¤erences are a source of comparative advantage among nations.
Using this simple theoretical framework, we have taken a rst step towards analyzing how
vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations. Among other things, we have
shown that local technological changes tend to spillover very di¤erently at the bottom and
the top of the chain. At the bottom of the chain, depending on the nature of technological
changes, countries may move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain
fully determine changes in the world income distribution within that region. At the top of
the chain, by contrast, local technological progress always leads countries to move up, but
even conditioning on the nature of technological change, inequality between nations within
that region may fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of
the chain benet disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production,
this is not always true at the top.
Although we have emphasized the consequences of vertical specialization for the interde-
pendence of nations, we believe that our general results also have useful applications outside
of international trade. Sequential production processes are pervasive in practice. They may
involve workers of di¤erent skills, as emphasized in the labor and organizations literature.
They may also involve rms of di¤erent productivity, as in the industrial organization lit-
erature. Whatever the particular context may be, our theoretical analysis may help shed a
new light on how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence between di¤erent actors
of a given supply chain.
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A Proofs (I): Free Trade Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 1. We proceed in four steps.
Step 1: p () is continuous.
Consider a stage s0 2 (0; S]. By equations (3) and (4), we know that there must be at least
one country, call it c0, producing intermediate good s0. By assumption, this country must also be
producing all intermediate goods s 2 (s0   ds; s0]. Thus condition (2) implies
p (s0) = (1 + c0ds) p (s0   ds) + wc0ds,
Taking the limit of the previous expression as ds goes to zero, we get
p (s0) = lim
s!s 0
p (s) . (10)
This already establishes the continuity of p () at S. Now consider s0 2 (0; S). By the same logic,
there must be at least one country, call it c0 again, producing all intermediate goods s 2 (s0; s0+ds].
Condition (2) therefore also implies
p (s0 + ds) = (1 + c0ds) p (s0) + wc0ds,
Taking the limit of the previous expression as ds goes to zero, we then get
lim
s!s+0
p (s) = p (s0) . (11)
The continuity of p () at s0 2 (0; S) directly derives from equations (10) and (11).
Step 2: p () is strictly increasing.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a pair of stages, s1 and s2, such that
s1 < s2 and p (s1)  p (s2). Since p () is continuous, there must also exist a stage s0 2 (s1; s2] and
an " > 0 such that p (s)  p (s0) for all s 2 (s0   "; s0]. As in Step 1, we know that there must be
at least one country, call it c0, producing intermediate good s0. This, in turn, requires
p (s0) = (1 + c0ds) p (s0   ds) + wc0ds > p (s0   ds) .
For ds small enough, the previous inequality contradicts p (s)  p (s0) for all s 2 (s0   "; s0].
Step 3: If c2 > c1, then wc2 > wc1.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two countries, c2 > c1, such that
wc2  wc1 . In a free trade equilibrium, equations (3) and (4) require country c1 to produce at least
one intermediate good in (0; 1), call it s1. By equation (1), this country must also be producing all
intermediate goods s 2 (s1   ds; s1]. Thus condition (2) implies
p (s1) = (1 + c1ds) p (s1   ds) + wc1ds, (12)
p (s1)  (1 + c2ds) p (s1   ds) + wc2ds, (13)
Since c2 < c1 , equation (12) and inequality (13) imply wc2 > wc1 , which contradicts wc2  wc1 .
29
Step 4: If c2 > c1 and Qc1 (s1) > 0, then Qc2 (s) = 0 for all s < s1.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two countries, c2 > c1, and two interme-
diate goods, s1 > s2 > 0, such that c1 produces s1 and c2 produces s2. By equation (1), c1 produces
all intermediate goods s 2 (s1 ds; s1], whereas c2 produces all intermediate goods s 2 (s2 ds; s2].
Thus condition (2) implies
p (s1) = (1 + c1ds) p (s1   ds) + wc1ds,
p (s2) = (1 + c2ds) p (s2   ds) + wc2ds,
p (s1)  (1 + c2ds) p (s1   ds) + wc2ds,
p (s2)  (1 + c1ds) p (s2   ds) + wc1ds.
Combining the four previous expressions, we get
[(1 + c2ds) p (s1   ds) + wc2ds] [(1 + c1ds) p (s2   ds) + wc1ds]
 [(1 + c1ds) p (s1   ds) + wc1ds] [(1 + c2ds) p (s2   ds) + wc2ds] ,
which can be rearranged as
(1 + c2ds) [p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds)]wc1
 (1 + c1ds) [p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds)]wc2
By Step 2, we know that p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds) > 0. Thus the previous inequality implies
(1 + c2ds)wc1  (1 + c1ds)wc2 . (14)
Since c2 < c1 , inequality (14) implies wc1 > wc2 , which contradicts Step 3.
To conclude the proof of Lemma 1, let us dene Sc  sup fs 2 SjQc (s) > 0g for all c 2 C. By
equation Step 4, we must have S0  0 < S1 < ::: < SC = 1, and for all s 2 S and c 2 C, Qc (s) > 0
if Sc 1 < s < Sc and Qc (s) = 0 if s < Sc 1 or s > Sc. Since Qc (s) > 0 requires Qc (s0) > 0 for all
s0 2 (s   ds; s], we must also have Qc (Sc) > 0 and Qc (Sc 1) = 0 for all c 2 C. Thus Qc (s) > 0 if
and only if s 2 (Sc 1; Sc]. Finally, by equations (3) and (4), country C must produce stage 1, so
that SC = 1. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. We rst consider equation (6). Lemma 1 and equation (3) imply
Qc (s2) Qc (s1) =  c
Z s2
s1
Qc (s) ds, for all s1; s2 2 (Sc 1; Sc]. (15)
Taking the derivative of the previous expression with respect to s2, we get
dQc (s) =ds =  cQc (s) , for all s 2 (Sc 1; Sc].
The solution of the previous di¤erential equation must satisfy
Qc (Sc) = e
 c(Sc Sc 1) lim
s!S+c 1
Qc (s) . (16)
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Lemma 1 and equation (3) also imply
Qc (Sc 1 + ds) Qc 1 (Sc 1   ds) =  
"
c lim
s!S+c 1
Qc (s) + c 1Qc 1 (Sc 1   ds)
#
ds.
Taking the limit of the previous expression as ds goes to zero, we get
lim
s!S+c 1
Qc (s) = lim
s!S c 1
Qc 1 (s) = Qc 1 (Sc 1) . (17)
Equation (6) derives from equations (16) and (17) and the denition of Qc  Qc (Sc).
Let us now turn to equation (5). By Lemma 1 and equation (4), we know thatZ Sc
Sc 1
Qc (s) ds = Lc, for all c 2 C. (18)
By equations (15) and (17), we also know thatZ Sc
Sc 1
Qc (s) ds =
1
c
[Qc 1 (Sc 1) Qc (Sc)] . (19)
Equations (18) and (19) imply
Lc =
1
c
[Qc 1 (Sc 1) Qc (Sc)] , for all c 2 C. (20)
Equation (5) derives from equations (6) and (20) and the denition of Qc  Qc (Sc). The boundary
conditions S0 = 0 and SC = 1 have already been established in the proof of Lemma 1. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. We rst consider equation (7). Lemma 1 and condition (2) imply
p (Sc + ds)  (1 + c+1ds) p (Sc)  wc+1ds  p (Sc + ds)  (1 + cds) p (Sc)  wcds,
p (Sc)  (1 + cds) p (Sc   ds)  wcds  p (Sc)  (1 + c+1ds) p (Sc   ds)  wc+1ds.
After simplications, the two previous inequalities can be rearranged as
(c   c+1) p (Sc)  wc+1   wc  (c   c+1) p (Sc   ds) .
Since p is continuous, taking the limit of the above chain of inequalities as ds goes to zero we get
wc+1   wc = (c   c+1) p (Sc) , for all s 2 (Sc 1; Sc].
which is equivalent to equation (7) by the denition of pc  p (Sc).
Let us now turn to equation (8). Lemma 1 and condition (2) imply
p (s+ ds) = (1 + cds) p (s) + wcds
31
Taking the limit of the previous expression as ds goes to zero, we get
dp (s) =ds = cp (s) + wc, for all s 2 (Sc 1; Sc].
The solution of the previous di¤erential equation must satisfy
p (Sc) = e
c(Sc Sc 1) lim
s!S+c 1
p (Sc 1) +
"
ec(Sc Sc 1)   1
c
#
(wc=c) ,
which is equivalent to equation (8) by the continuity of p () and the denitions of Nc  Sc   Sc 1
and pc  p (Sc). The boundary conditions derive from the fact that p0 = p (S0) = p(0) = 0 and
pC = p (SC) = p (1) = 1. QED.
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed in four steps.
Step 1: (S0; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC) satisfy equations (5) and (6) if and only if
Sc = S0 +
Pc
c0=1

1
c0

ln
"
Q0  
Pc0 1
c00=1 c00Lc00
Q0  
Pc0
c00=1 c00Lc00
#
, for all c 2 C, (21)
Qc = Q0  
Pc
c0=1 c0Lc0, for all c 2 C. (22)
Let us rst show that if (S0; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC) satisfy equations (5) and (6), then they satisfy
equations (21) and (22). Consider equation (22). Equations (5) and (6) imply
Qc = Qc 1   cLc, for all c 2 C,
By iteration we therefore have
Qc = Q0  
Pc
c0=1 c0Lc0 , for all c 2 C.
Now consider equation (21). Starting from equation (5) and iterating we get
Sc = S0  
Pc
c0=1

1
c0

ln

1  c0Lc0
Qc0 1

, for all c 2 C.
Equation (21) directly derives from the previous expression and equation (22). It is a matter of
simple algebra to check that if (S0; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC) satisfy equations (21) and (22), then
they satisfy equations (5) and (6).
Step 2: There exists a unique pair of vectors (S0; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC) satisfying equations
(5) and (6) and the boundary conditions: S0 = 0 and SC = 1.
Let Q
0
 PCc=1 cLc. By Step 1, if Q0  Q0, then there does not exist a pair of vec-
tors (S0; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC) that satisfy equations (5) and (6). Otherwise (Q0; :::; QC) and
(S0; :::; SC) would also satisfy equations (21) and (22), which cannot be the case if Q0  Q0. Now
consider Q0 > Q0. From equation (21), it is easy to check that @SC=@Q0 < 0 for all Q0 > Q0;
limQ0!Q+0 SC = +1; and limQ0!+1 SC = S0. Thus conditional on having set S0 = 0, there ex-
ists a unique Q0 > Q0 such that (S0; :::; SC) and (Q0; :::; QC) satisfy equations (21) and (22) and
SC = S. Step 2 derives from Step 1 and the previous observation.
32
Step 3: For any (N1; :::; NC), there exists a unique pair of vectors (w1; :::; wC) and (p0; :::; pC)
satisfying equations (7) and (8) and the boundary conditions: p0 = 0 and pC = 1.
For any (N1; :::; NC), w1, and p0, there trivially exists a unique pair of vectors (w2; :::; wC) and
(p1; :::; pC) that satisfy equations (7) and (8). Thus taking (N1; :::; NC) as given and having set
p0 = 0, we only need to check that there exists a unique w1 such that pC = 1. To do so, we rst
establish that pC is strictly increasing in w1. We proceed by iteration. By equation (8), we know
that p1 is strictly increasing in w1. Thus by equation (7), w2 must be strictly increasing in w1 as
well. Now suppose that pc 1 and wc are strictly increasing in w1 for c < C. Then pc must be strictly
increasing in w1, by equation (8), wc+1 must be strictly increasing in w1, by equation (7). At this
point we have established, by iteration, that pC 1 and wC are strictly increasing in w1. Combining
this observation with equation (8), we obtain that pC is strictly increasing in w1. To conclude, let
us note that, by equations (7) and (8), we also have limw1!0 pC = 0 and limw1!+1 pC = +1.
Since pC is strictly increasing in w1, there therefore exists a unique w1 such that pC = 1.
Steps 1-3 imply the existence and uniqueness of (S0; :::; SC), (Q0; :::; QC), (w1; :::; wC), and
(p0; :::; pC) that satisfy equations (5)-(8) with boundary conditions S0 = 0, SC = 1, p0 = 0, and
pC = 1. Now consider the following output levels and intermediate good prices
Qc (s) = e
 c(s Sc 1)Qc 1, for all s 2 (Sc 1; Sc],
p (s) = ec(s Sc 1)pc 1 +
h
ec(s Sc 1)   1
i
(wc=c) for all s 2 (Sc 1; Sc].
By construction, [Q1 () ; :::; QC ()], (w1; :::; wC), and p () satisfy conditions (2)-(4). Thus a free
trade equilibrium exists. Since (S0; :::; SC), (Q0; :::; QC), (w1; :::; wC), and (p0; :::; pC) are unique,
the free trade equilibrium is unique as well by Lemmas 1-3. QED.
B Proofs (II): Global Technological Change
Proof of Proposition 2. We decompose the proof of Proposition 2 into three parts. First, we
show that an increase in S increases the measure of stages Nc performed in all countries. Second,
we show that an increase in S leads all countries to move up the supply chain. Third, we show that
an increase in S increase inequality between countries around the world.
Part I: If S0 > S, then N 0c > Nc for all c 2 C.
We rst show that N 01 > N1 by contradiction. Suppose that N 01  N1. By equation (5),
equation (6) and the denition of Nc  Sc   Sc 1, we know that
Nc =  

1
c

ln

1 

cLc
c 1Lc 1

ec 1Nc 1   1

, for all c > 1, (23)
According to equation (23), we have @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0. Thus by iteration, N 01  N1 implies N 0c  Nc
for all countries c 2 C. This further implies PCc=1N 0c = S0C   S00  SC   S0 = PCc=1Nc, which
contradicts S0C   S00 > SC   S0 by Lemma 2. Starting from N 01 > N1, we can then use equation
(23) again to show by iteration that N 0c > Nc for all c 2 C. This completes the proof of Part I.
Part II: If S0 > S, then S0c > Sc for all c 2 C.
We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2 and Part I, we know that S01 = N 01 > S1 = N1. Thus
S0c > Sc is satised for c = 1. Let us now show that if S0c > Sc for 1  c < C, then S0c+1 > Sc+1. By
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denition, we know that S0c+1 = S0c + N 0c+1 and Sc+1 = Sc + Nc+1. By Part I, we also know that
N 0c+1 > Nc+1. Thus S0c > Sc implies S0c+1 > Sc+1. This concludes the proof of Part II.
Part III: If S0 > S, then (wc+1=wc)0 > (wc+1=wc) for all c < C.
The proof of Part III proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If N 01 > N1, then (w2=w1)
0 > (w2=w1).
Since p0 = 0, we know from equations (7) and (8) that
w2
w1
= 1 +
1
1
(1   2)

e1N1   1

. (24)
Combining equation (24) and N 01 > N1, we obtain (w2=w1)
0 > (w2=w1). This completes the proof
of Step 1.
Step 2: For any country 1 < c < C, if N 0c > Nc and (wc=wc 1)
0 > (wc=wc 1), then (wc+1=wc)0 >
(wc+1=wc).
Consider a country 1 < c < C. Equations (7) and (8) imply
wc+1
wc
= 1 + (c   c+1)

ecNc   1
c

+ ecNc

wc 1
wc

pc 1
wc 1

(25)
By equation (7), we also know that
wc
wc 1
= 1 + (c 1   c)

pc 1
wc 1

, (26)
which further implies 
wc 1
wc

pc 1
wc 1

=
(pc 1=wc 1)
1 + (c 1   c) (pc 1=wc 1) . (27)
Since (wc=wc 1)0 > (wc=wc 1) and c 1 > c, equation (26) immediately implies
pc 1
wc 1
0
>

pc 1
wc 1

.
Combining this observation with equation (27) the right-hand side of which is increasing in
(pc 1=wc 1) we obtain 
wc 1
wc
0 pc 1
wc 1
0
>

wc 1
wc

pc 1
wc 1

. (28)
To conclude, note that N 0c > Nc implies ecN
0
c > ecNc . Thus equation (25) and inequality (28)
imply (wc+1=wc)
0 > (wc+1=wc). This completes the proof of Step 2. Combining Part I with Steps
1 and 2, it is then easy to establish Part III by iteration. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. We decompose the proof of Proposition 3 into three parts. First, we
show that a decrease in  increases the measure of stages Nc performed by all countries c < c1 and
decreases the measure of stages Nc performed by all countries c  c1, with 1 < c1  C. Second,
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we show that a decrease in  leads all countries to move up. Third, we show that a decrease in 
decreases inequality between countries around the world.
Part I: If 0 < , then there exists 1 < c1  C such that N 0c > Nc if and only if c < c1.
Equation (5), equation (6), and the denition of Nc imply
Nc =  

1
c

ln

1 

cLc
c 1Lc 1

ec 1Nc 1   1

, for all c > 1, (29)
where @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 and @Nc=@ > 0. Since 0 < , equation (29) implies that if N 0c 1  Nc 1
for c > 1, then N 0c < Nc. This further implies the existence of 1  c1  C + 1 such that
N 0c > Nc if and only if c < c1. To conclude the proof of Part I, note that if c1 = 1, thenPC
c=1N
0
c = S
0
C   S00 < SC   S0 =
PC
c=1Nc, which contradicts S
0
C   S00 = SC   S0 by Lemma 2.
Similarly, if c1 = C + 1, then
PC
c=1N
0
c = S
0
C   S00 > SC   S0 =
PC
c=1Nc, which also contradicts
S0C   S00 = SC   S0 by Lemma 2. This completes the proof of Part I.
Part II: If 0 < , then S0c  Sc for all c 2 C.
We rst show by iteration that S0c > Sc if c < c1. By Lemma 2 and Part I, we know that
S01 = N 01 > S1 = N1. Thus S0c > Sc is satised for c = 1. Let us now show that if S0c > Sc
for 1  c < c1   1, then S0c+1 > Sc+1. By denition, we know that S0c+1 = S0c + N 0c+1 and
Sc+1 = Sc + Nc+1. By Part I, we also know that N 0c+1 > Nc+1 if c < c1   1. Thus S0c > Sc for
1  c < c1   1 implies S0c+1 > Sc+1. This establishes that S0c > Sc if c < c1. To conclude the
proof of Part II, we now show by iteration that S0c  Sc if c  c1. By Lemma 2, we know that
S0C = SC = S. Thus S
0
c  Sc is satised for c = C. Let us now show that if S0c  Sc for c1 < c  C,
then S0c 1  Sc 1. By denition, we know that S0c 1 = S0c   N 0c and Sc 1 = Sc   Nc. By Part I,
we also know that N 0c  Nc if c > c1. This establishes that S0c  Sc if c  c1, which completes the
proof of Part II.
Part III: If 0 < , then (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc) for all c < C.
Throughout this part of the proof, we let eNc  Nc and epc  pc. The proof of Part III
proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If 0 < , then eN 0c < eNc for all countries c 2 C.
The proof is similar to Part I of the proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that eN 01 < eN1 by
contradiction. Suppose that eN 01  eN1. By equation (5), equation (6) and the denition of eNc, we
know that eNc =   1
c

ln

1 

cLc
c 1Lc 1

ec 1
eNc 1   1 , for all c > 1, (30)
where @ eNc=@ eNc 1 > 0. Thus by iteration, eN 01  eN1 implies N 0c  Nc for all countries c 2 C. This
implies 0
PC
c=1N
0
c

=
PC
c=1
eN 0c  PCc=1 eNc =  PCc=1Nc. Since 0 < , this further impliesPC
c=1N
0
c = S
0
C   S00 > SC   S0 =
PC
c=1Nc, which contradicts S
0
C   S00 = SC   S0 by Lemma 2.
Starting from eN 01 < eN1, we can now use equation (30) to show by iteration that eN 0c < eNc for all
c 2 C. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: If eN 0c < eNc for all countries c 2 C, then (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc) for all c < C.
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Equations (7) and (8) can be rearranged as
wc+1 = wc + (c   c+1) epc, for all c < C, (31)epc = ec eNcepc 1 + ec eNc   1 (wc=c) , for all c 2 C. (32)
Following the exact same strategy as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2, it is then easy to
show by iteration that (wc+1=wc)
0 < (wc+1=wc) for all c < C. Part II directly follows from Steps 1
and 2. QED.
C Proofs (III): Local Technological Change
Proof of Proposition 4. We decompose the proof of Proposition 4 into three parts. First, we
show that an increase in Lc0 increases the measure of stages performed in country c0 and decreases
the measure of stages performed in any other country. Second, we show that an increase in Lc0 leads
all countries all countries c < c0 to move down and all countries c > c0 move up. Third, we show
that an increase in Lc0 decreases inequality among countries c 2 f1; :::; c0g, increases inequality
among countries c 2 fc0; :::; c1g, and decreases inequality among countries c 2 fc1; :::; Cg, with
c1 2 fc0 + 1; :::; Cg.
Part I: If L0c0 > Lc0, then N
0
c0 > Nc0 and N
0
c < Nc for all c 6= c0.
Like in our previous proofs, we will repeatedly use the following relationship
Nc =  

1
c

ln

1 

cLc
c 1Lc 1

ec 1Nc 1   1

, for all c > 1, (23)
where @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 and @Nc=@Lc > 0. The proof of Part I proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If L0c0 > Lc0, then N
0
c < Nc for all c > c0.
Let us rst establish that Q0C > QC . By Lemma 1, we know that Q
0
C  Q0C (1) =
PC
c=1Q
0
c (1).
By the First Welfare Theorem, we also know that the allocation in a free trade equilibrium is Pareto
optimal. Thus Q0C must be the maximum output level of the nal good attainable given the new
resource and technological constraints, i.e.,
Q0C = argmaxeQ1();:::; eQC()
PC
c=1
eQc (1) ,
subject to PC
c=1
eQc (s2) PCc=1 eQc (s1)   R s2s1 PCc=1 c eQc (s) ds, for all s1  s2, (33)Z S
0
eQc (s) ds  L0c, for all c 2 C, (34)
where L0c0 > Lc0 and L
0
c = Lc for all c 6= c0. Now consider eQ1 () ; :::; eQC () such that
eQc0 (s)  Qc0 (s) +  c0e c0s
1  e c0S
 
L0c0   Lc0

, for all s 2 S,
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and eQc (s)  Qc (s) , for all s 2 S and c 6= c0.
Since Q1 () ; :::; QC () satises the initial resource and technological constraints, as described by
conditions (3) and (4), eQ1 () ; :::; eQC () must satisfy, by construction, the new resource and tech-
nological constraints, as described by conditions (33) and (34). Since L0c0 > Lc0 , we must also
have eQc0(1) + eQC (1) =  c0e c0S
1  e c0S
 
L0c0   Lc0

+QC > QC .
Since Q0C  eQc0 (1) + eQC (1), the previous inequality implies Q0C > QC . By equation (5), equation
(6), and the denition of Nc, we also know that
NC =

1
c

ln

1 +
CLC
QC

.
Thus if C > c0, Q0C > QC and L
0
C = LC imply N
0
C < NC . To conclude the proof of Step 1, note
that if N 0c < Nc for c > c0 + 1, then L0c 1 = Lc 1 and equation (23) imply N 0c 1 < Nc 1. Thus by
iteration, N 0c < Nc for all c > c0.
Step 2: If L0c0 > Lc0, then N
0
c < Nc for all c < c0.
We rst show by contradiction that if L0c0 > Lc0 and c0 > 1, then N
0
1 < N1. Suppose that
N 01  N1. Since L0c = Lc for all c < c0, we can use equation (23) the fact that @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 to
establish by iteration that N 0c  Nc for all c < c0. Since L0c0 > Lc0 and L0c0 1 = Lc0 1, we can
further use equation (23) the facts that @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 and that @Nc=@Lc > 0 to establish that
N 0c0 > Nc0 . To show that N
0
c0+1
> Nc0+1, we use the two following relationships
Qc 1 =
cLc
1  e cNc , for all c 2 C (35)
Qc =
cLce
 cNc
1  e cNc , for all c 2 C. (36)
Equation (35) derives from equation (5) and the denition of Nc  Sc Sc 1. Equation (36) further
uses equation (6). Since N 0c0 1 > Nc0 1 and L
0
c0 1 = Lc0 1, equation (36) in particular, the fact
that @Qc=@Nc < 0 implies Q0c0 1 < Qc0 1. Since Q
0
c0 1 < Qc0 1 and N
0
c0 > Nc0 , equation (6)
implies Q0c0 < Qc0 . Finally, since Q
0
c0 < Qc0 and L
0
c0+1
= Lc0+1, equation (35) in particular, the
fact that @Qc 1=@Nc < 0 implies N 0c0+1 > Nc0+1. Since N
0
c0+1
> Nc0+1, and L
0
c = Lc for all
c > c0, we can further use equation (23) in particular, the fact that @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 to establish
by iteration that N 0c > Nc for all c > c0. This implies
PC
c=1N
0
c = S
0
C   S00 > SC   S0 =
PC
c=1Nc,
which contradicts S0C   S00 = SC   S0 = 1 by Lemma 2. At this point, we have established that if
L0c0 > Lc0 and c0 > 1, then N
0
1 < N1. To conclude the proof of Step 2, note that if N
0
c < Nc for
c < c0   1, then L0c+1 = Lc+1 and equation (23) imply N 0c+1 < Nc+1. Thus by iteration, N 0c < Nc
for all c < c0. Part I directly derives from Step 1, Step 2, and the fact that
PC
c=1N
0
c =
PC
c=1Nc
= 1, by Lemma 2.
Part II: If L0c0 > Lc0, then S
0
c  Sc for all c < c0 and S0c  Sc for all c  c0.
The proof of Part II proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If L0c0 > Lc0, then S
0
c  Sc for all c  c0.
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We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2, we know that S0C = SC = S. Thus S
0
c  Sc is satised
for c = C. Let us now show that if S0c  Sc and c > c0, then S0c 1  Sc 1. Since c > c0,
L0c0 > Lc0 and Part I imply N
0
c < Nc. Combining this observation with S
0
c  Sc and the denition
of Nc  Sc   Sc 1, we obtain S0c 1  Sc 1. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: If L0c0 > Lc0, then S
0
c 1  Sc 1 for all c  c0.
We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2, we know that S00 = S0 = 0. Thus S0c 1  Sc 1 is
satised for c = 1. Let us now show that if S0c 1  Sc 1 and c < c0, then S0c  Sc. Since c < c0,
L0c0 > Lc0 and Part I imply N
0
c < Nc. Combining this observation with S
0
c 1  Sc 1 and the
denition of Nc  Sc   Sc 1, we obtain S0c  Sc. This completes the proof of Step 2. Part II
directly follows from Steps 1 and 2
Part III: If L0c0 > Lc0, then there exists c0 + 1  c1  C such that (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for
all 1  c < c0; (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all c0  c < c1; and (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all
c1  c < C.
The proof of Part III proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: If L0c0 > Lc0, then (wc+1=wc)
0 < (wc+1=wc) for all c < c0.
By Part I, we know that N 0c < Nc for all c < c0. Thus we can use the same argument as in Part
III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that (wc+1=wc)
0 < (wc+1=wc) for all c < c0.
Step 2: If L0c0 > Lc0, then there exists c0  c1  C such that (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all
c0  c < c1 and (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all c1  c < C.
By Part I, we also know that N 0c > Nc for all c > c0. Thus we can again use the same
argument as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that if there exists ec  c0 such that
(wec+1=wec)0 < (wec+1=wec), then (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc) for all ec  c < C. To conclude the proof
of Step 2, let us just dene c1  inf

c  c0j (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc)
	
. By construction, wc+1=wc
rises for all c0  c < c1 and falls for all c1  c < C. In order to complete the proof of Part III, the
only thing left to show is that c1 > c0, which is what we establish in our nal step.
Step 3: If L0c0 > Lc0 and c0 6= C, then (wc0+1=wc0)0 > (wc0+1=wc0).
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that (wc0+1=wc0)
0  (wc0+1=wc0). Then for any " > 0,
there must also exist Lc0  ~Lc0 < ~L0c0  L0c0 such that j~L0c0   ~Lc0 j < " and
( ~wc0+1= ~wc0)
0  ( ~wc0+1= ~wc0) , (37)
where ( ~w1; :::; ~wC) and ( ~w01; :::; ~w0C) denote the world income distribution if labor endowments in
country c0 are equal to eLc0 and ~L0c0 , respectively. For j~L0c0   ~Lc0 j small enough, Lemma 2 implies
~S01 < ~S1 < ~S
0
2 < ::: < ~S
0
c0 1 < ~Sc0 1 < ~Sc0 < ~S
0
c0 <
~Sc0+1 < ::::, (38)
where

~S1; :::; ~SC

and

~S01; :::; ~S0C

denote the pattern of vertical specialization if labor endowments
in country c0 are equal to eLc0 and ~L0c0 , respectively. First, note that for any c < c0   1, since
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~S0c < ~Sc < ~S0c+1 < ~Sc+1, condition (2) implies that
~p0

~S0c+1

~w0c+1
=
ec+1(
~S0c+1  ~Sc)~p0

~Sc

~w0c+1
+
ec+1(
~S0c+1  ~Sc)   1
c+1
,
~p

~S0c+1

~wc+1
=
ec+1(
~S0c+1  ~Sc)~p

~Sc

~wc+1
+
ec+1(
~S0c+1  ~Sc)   1
c+1
,
where ~p () and ~p0 () denote the schedule of prices if labor endowments in country c0 are equal toeLc0 and ~L0c0 , respectively. Since ~S0c+1 > ~Sc, the two previous equations further imply that for any
c < c0   1,
~p0

~Sc

= ~w0c+1  ~p

~Sc

= ~wc+1 ) ~p0

~S0c+1

= ~w0c+1  ~p

~S0c+1

= ~wc+1. (39)
Second, note that for any c < c0, since ~Sc 1 < ~S0c < ~Sc, condition (2) also implies that
~p0

~Sc

~w0c+1
=
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c)~p0

~S0c

~w0c+1
+
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
c+1
, (40)
~p

~Sc

~wc+1
=
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)~p

~S0c

~wc+1
+
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
c

~wc
~wc+1

. (41)
Let us now show that if ~p0

~S0c

= ~w0c  ~p

~S0c

= ~wc, then
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c)~p0

~S0c

~w0c+1

ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)~p

~S0c

~wc+1
, (42)
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
c+1
 e
c( ~Sc  ~S0c)   1
c

~wc
~wc+1

. (43)
We start with inequality (42), which can be rearranged as
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c) ~w
0
c
~w0c+1
~p0

~S0c

~w0c
 ec( ~Sc  ~S0c) ~wc
~wc+1
~p

~S0c

~wc
.
By equation (7), we know that
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c) ~wc
~wc+1
~p

~S0c

~wc
=
~p( ~S0c)
~wc
1 + (c   c+1) ~p(
~Sc)
~wc
, (44)
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c) ~w
0
c
~w0c+1
~p0

~S0c

~w0c
=
~p0( ~S0c)
~w0c
1 + (c   c+1) ~p
0( ~S0c)
~w0c
. (45)
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Under the assumption that ~p0

~S0c

= ~w0c  ~p

~S0c

= ~wc, equations (44) and (45) imply
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c) ~w
0
c
~w0c+1
~p0

~S0c

~w0c

~p( ~S0c)
~wc
1 + (c   c+1) ~p(
~S0c)
~wc
> ec(
~Sc  ~S0c) ~wc
~wc+1
~p

~S0c

~wc
,
where the second inequality also uses the fact that ~S0c < ~Sc. Thus inequality (42) holds. Let us
now consider inequality (43), which can be rearranged as
c

ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1

c+1

ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
  ~wc
~wc+1
. (46)
Since ~Sc 1 < ~S0c for any c < c0, condition (2) implies ~pc

~Sc

= ~wc 
h
ec(
~Sc  ~Sc 1)   1
i
=c >h
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
i
=c. Combining the previous inequality with equation (7), we obtain
~wc
~wc+1
=
1
1 + (c   c+1) ~p(
~Sc)
~wc
<
c
c + (c   c+1)
h
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
i (47)
By inequalities (46) and (47), a su¢ cient condition for inequality (43) to hold is
c
h
ec+1(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
i
c+1
h
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
i  c
c + (c   c+1)
h
ec(
~Sc  ~S0c)   1
i ,
which can be rearranged as c=
h
1  e c( ~Sc  ~S0c)
i
 c+1=
h
1  e c+1( ~Sc  ~S0c)
i
. The previous in-
equality necessarily holds since f(x)  x
1 e tx is increasing in x for t > 0. At this point, we
have established that inequalities (42) and (43) hold if ~p0

~S0c

= ~w0c  ~p

~S0c

= ~wc. Combining this
observation with equations (40) and (41), we further have that for any c < c0,
~p0

~S0c

= ~w0c  ~p

~S0c

= ~wc ) ~p0

~Sc

= ~w0c+1  ~p

~Sc

= ~wc+1. (48)
Since ~p0 (0) = ~p (0) = 0, we know that ~p0

~S0

= ~w01  ~p

~S0

= ~w1. Thus we can use implications
(39) and (48) to establish, by iteration, that
~p0

~Sc0 1

~w0c0

~p

~Sc0 1

~wc0
. (49)
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Since eSc0 < eS0c0 , we know from condition (2) that
~p0

~Sc0

~w0c0
=
ec0(
~Sc0  ~Sc0 1)~p0

~Sc0 1

~w0c0
+
ec0(
~Sc0  ~Sc0 1)   1
c0
, (50)
~p

~Sc0

~wc0
=
ec0(
~Sc0  ~Sc0 1)~p

~Sc0 1

~wc0
+
ec0(
~Sc0  ~Sc0 1)   1
c0
: (51)
Inequality (49) and equations (50) and (51) imply ~p0

~Sc0

= ~w0c0  ~p

~Sc0

= ~wc0 . Finally, sinceeSc0 < eS0c0 , we also know that ~p0  ~S0c0 = ~w0c0 > ~p0  ~Sc0 = ~w0c0 . Combining these two observations,
we get ~p0

~S0c0

= ~w0c0 > ~p

~Sc0

= ~wc0 . Together with equation (7), the previous inequality implies
( ~wc0+1= ~wc0)
0 > ( ~wc0+1= ~wc0), which contradicts inequality (37). Thus (wc0+1=wc0)
0 > (wc0+1=wc0),
which implies c1  inf

c  c0j (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc)
	
> c0. As mentioned above, Part III
directly follows from Steps 1-3. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. We decompose the proof of Proposition 5 into three parts. First, we
show that a decrease in c0 increases the measure of stages Nc performed in all countries c < c0
and decreases the measure of stages Nc performed in all countries c > c0. Second, we show that
a decrease in c0 leads all countries to move up. Third, we show that a decrease in c0 increases
inequality among countries c 2 f1; :::; c0g, decreases inequality among countries c 2 fc0; c0 + 1g,
increases inequality among countries c 2 fc0 + 1; :::; c1g, and decreases inequality among countries
c 2 fc1; :::; Cg, with c1 2 fc0 + 1; :::; Cg.
Part I: If 0c0 < c0, then N
0
c > Nc for all c < c0 and N
0
c < Nc for all c > c0.
Like in our previous proofs, we will repeatedly use the following relationship
Nc =  

1
c

ln

1 

cLc
c 1Lc 1

ec 1Nc 1   1

, for all c > 1, (23)
where @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0, @Nc=@c 1 > 0, and @Nc=@c > 0. The proof of Part I proceeds in two
steps.
Step 1: If 0c0 < c0, then N
0
c < Nc for all c > c0.
Let us rst establish that Q0C > QC . By the same argument as in Step 1 of Proposition 4, Q
0
C
must be such that
Q0C = argmaxeQ1();:::; eQC()
PC
c=1
eQc (S) ,
subject to PC
c=1
eQc (s2) PCc=1 eQc (s1)   R s2s1 PCc=1 0c eQc (s) ds, for all s1  s2, (52)Z S
0
eQc (s) ds  Lc, for all c 2 C, (53)
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where 0c0 < c0 and 
0
c = c for all c 6= c0. Now consider eQ1 () ; :::; eQC () such that
eQc0 (s)  e (c0 0c0)(Sc0 s)Qc0 (s)
+
 
0c0e
 0c0s
1  e 0c0S
!Z Sc0
Sc0 1
h
1  e (c0 0c0)(Sc0 t)
i
Qc0 (t) dt, for all s 2 S,
and eQc (s)  Qc (s) , for all s 2 S and c 6= c0.
Since Q1 () ; :::; QC () satisfy the initial resource and technological constraints, as described by
equations (3) and (4), eQ1 () ; :::; eQC () must satisfy, by construction, the new resource and tech-
nological constraints, as described by equations (52) and (53). Since 0c0 < c0 , we must also
have
eQc0 (1) + eQC (1) =  c0e c0S
1  e c0S
Z Sc0
Sc0 1
h
1  e (c0 0c0)(Sc0 t)
i
Qc0 (t) dt+QC > QC .
Since Q0C  eQc0 (1)+ eQC (1), the previous inequality implies Q0C > QC . Combining this observation
with equation (36) and the fact that c0 6= C, which implies 0C = C , we get N 0C < NC . To conclude
the proof of Step 1, note that if N 0c < Nc for c > c0 + 1, then 
0
c 1 = c 1 and equation (23) the
fact that @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 imply N 0c 1 < Nc 1. Thus by iteration, N 0c < Nc for all c > c0.
Step 2: If 0c0 < c0, then N
0
c > Nc for all c < c0.
We rst show by contradiction that if 0c0 < c0 and c0 > 1, then N
0
1 > N1. Suppose that
N 01  N1. Since 0c = c for all c < c0, we can use equation (23) the fact that @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0
 to establish by iteration that N 0c  Nc for all c < c0. Since 0c0 < c0 , 0c0 1 = c0 1, and
N 0c0 1  Nc0 1, we can use equation (23) the facts that @Nc=@Nc 1 > 0 and @Nc=@c > 0 to
establish that N 0c0 < Nc0 . By Step 1, we also know that N
0
c < Nc for all c > c0. This impliesPC
c=1N
0
c = S
0
C   S00 < SC   S0 =
PC
c=1Nc, which contradicts S
0
C   S00 = SC   S0 = 1 by Lemma
2. At this point, we have established that if 0c0 < c0 and c0 > 1, then N
0
1 > N1. To conclude the
proof of Step 2, note that if N 0c > Nc for c < c0   1, then 0c = c, 0c+1 = c+1, and equation (23)
imply N 0c+1 > Nc+1. Thus by iteration, N 0c > Nc for all c < c0. Part I directly derives from Steps
1 and 2.
Part II: If 0c0 < c0, then S
0
c  Sc for all c 2 C.
The proof of Part II proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If 0c0 < c0, then S
0
c  Sc for all c  c0.
The proof is identical to the proof of Step 1 Part II of Proposition 4 and omitted.
Step 2: If 0c0 < c0, then S
0
c 1  Sc 1 for all c  c0.
We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 2, we know that S00 = S0 = 0. Thus S0c 1  Sc 1 is
satised for c = 1. Let us now show that if S0c 1  Sc 1 and c < c0, then S0c  Sc. Since c < c0,
0c0 < c0 and Part I imply N
0
c > Nc. Combining this observation with S
0
c 1  Sc 1 and the
denition of Nc  Sc   Sc 1, we obtain S0c  Sc. This completes the proof of Step 2. Part II
directly derives from Steps 1 and 2.
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Part III: If 0c0 < c0, then there exist c0 < c1  C such that (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all c < c0;
(wc0+1=wc0)
0  wc0+1=wc0 ; (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all c0 < c < c1; and (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc
for all c1  c < C.
The proof of Part III proceeds in four steps.
Step 1: If 0c0 < c0, then (wc+1=wc)
0 > (wc+1=wc) for all c < c0.
By Part I, we know that N 0c > Nc for all c < c0. Thus we can use the same argument as in Part
III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that (wc+1=wc)
0 > (wc+1=wc) for all c < c0.
Step 2: If 0c0 < c0and c0 > 1, then S
0
c0   S0c0 1 <
c0
0c0
(Sc0   S0c0 1).
In the proof of Step 2, we let Q0(s) and p0 (s), denote the output at stage s and the price of
stage s if the failure rate in country c0 is equal to 0c0 .From Equation (36), we have
Q1 =
1L1e
 1N1
1  e 1N1 .
Similarly, we have
Q0(S1) =
1L
1
1e
 1N 01
1  e 1N 01 ;
where L11 is the population in county 1 employed in producing goods (0; S1) when the failure rate
of country c0 is 0c0 . The two previous equations, together with N
0
1 > N1 and L
1
1 < L1, therefore,
imply Q0(S1) < Q1. Assume that Q0(Sc) < Qc holds for some 1  c  c0   2. Since c+ 1 < c0,
Qc+1 = e
 c+1Nc+1Qc
> e c+1(Sc+1 S
0
c+S
0
c Sc)Q0(Sc)
 e c(S0c Sc) c+1(Sc+1 S0c)Q0(Sc)
= e c+1(Sc+1 S
0
c)Q0(S0c)
= Q0(Sc+1):
Therefore, by iteration,
Q0(Sc) < Qc for all 1  c  c0   1. (54)
By equation (54), which implies Q0(Sc0 1) < Qc0 1, and equation (1), we have
Q0c0 = e
 0c0 (S0c0 S0c0 1) c0 1(S
0
c0 1 Sc0 1)Q0(Sc0 1)
< e 
0
c0
(S0c0 S0c0 1) c0 1(S
0
c0 1 Sc0 1)Qc0 1. (55)
Equation (6) implies
Qc0 = e
 c0 (Sc0 Sc0 1)Qc0 1. (56)
By the proof of Part I of Proposition 5, we have N 0c0+1 < Nc0+1. Equation (35) and N
0
c0+1
< Nc0+1
imply Q0c0 > Qc0 . Equation (55), equation (56), and Q
0
c0 > Qc0 imply
e 
0
c0
(S0c0 S0c0 1) c0 1(S
0
c0 1 Sc0 1) > e c0 (Sc0 Sc0 1),
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which implies
S0c0   S0c0 1 <
c0
0c0
(Sc0   S0c0 1) 
c0 1   c0
0c0
(S0c0 1   Sc0 1) 
c0
0c0
(Sc0   S0c0 1),
concluding the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: If 0c0 < c0and c0 < C, then (wc0+1=wc0)
0  wc0+1=wc0.
By Part II, there exists, , a small neighborhood of c0 , such that if the failure rate in country
c0 is equal to 0c0 2  and 0c0 < c0 , the following sequence of inequalities holds:
S1 < S
0
1 < S2 < S
0
2 < ::: < Sc0 1 < S
0
c0 1 < Sc0 < S
0
c0 < Sc0+1 < :::;
where (S01; :::; S0C) denote the pattern of vertical specialization if the failure rate in country c0 is
equal to 0c0 . In exactly the same way as we have proceeded in Part III of Proposition 4, one can
show by iteration that
p0(S0c0 1)
w0c0
 p(S
0
c0 1)
wc0
.
Notice that the fact that failure rate in country c0 falls from c0 to 
0
c0 only loosens the inequality.
Equations (9) and (2) imply
w0c0+1
w0c0
  1 = (0c0   c0+1)
"
p0(S0c0 1)
w0c0
e
0
c0
(S0c0 S0c0 1) +
e
0
c0
(S0c0 S0c0 1)   1
0c0
#
.
From Step 2, we therefore have
w0c0+1
w0c0
  1 < (0c0   c0+1)
"
p(S0c0 1)
wc0
ec0 (Sc0 S
0
c0 1) +
ec0 (Sc0 S
0
c0 1)   1
0c0
#
(57)
Equation (57) and 0c0 < c0 imply
w0c0+1
w0c0
  1 < (c0   c0+1)
"
p(S0c0 1)
wc0
ec0 (Sc0 S
0
c0 1) +
ec0 (Sc0 S
0
c0 1)   1
c0
#
. (58)
Equations (9) and (2) imply
wc0+1
wc0
  1 = (c0   c0+1)
"
p(S0c0 1)
wc0
ec0 (Sc0 S
0
c0 1) +
ec0 (Sc0 S
0
c0 1)   1
c0
#
. (59)
Finally, equations (58) and (59) imply w0c0+1=w
0
c0 < wc0+1=wc0 .
Step 4: If 0c0 < c0, then there exists c0 < c1  C such that (wc+1=wc)0  wc+1=wc for all
c0 < c < c1; and (wc+1=wc)
0  wc+1=wc for all c1  c < C.
By Part I, we also know that N 0c > Nc for all c > c0. Thus we can again use the same
argument as in Part III of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that if there exists ec > c0 such that
(wec+1=wec)0 < (wec+1=wec), then (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc) for all ec  c < C. To conclude the proof
44
of Step 4, let us just dene c1  inf

c > c0j (wc+1=wc)0 < (wc+1=wc)
	
. By construction, wc+1=wc
rises for all c0 < c < c1 and falls for all c1  c < C. This concludes the proof of Part III. QED.
D Proofs (IV): Extensions
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 1, we already know that Lemma 4 is true if  = 1. In the rest
of this proof we therefore assume that  < 1. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: In any competitive equilibrium, Cu is a step-function for all u 2 0; QW .
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that Cu is not a step-function. In this case, the number
of international transactions associated with the production of that particular unit must be innite.
Thus the cost of producing that unit must be innite as well, which is incompatible with zero prots.
Step 2: In any competitive equilibrium, Cu is increasing in s for all u 2 0; QW .
Let us start by computing the expected cost of producing a given unit u. By Step 1, we know
that that there must be a sequence of countries fcu1 ; :::; cung and stages fsu1 ; :::; sung such that: (i)
cuk 6= cuk+1 for all k = 1; ::; n   1; (ii) su0 = 0 < su1 < ::: < sun 1 < sun = S; and (iii) Cu (s) = cuk for
all s 2  suk 1; suk. Let puk denote the cost of producing that unit up to stage suk . By the same logic
as in the proof of Lemma 3, we know that fpu1 ; :::; pung satisfy
puk = e
cu
k
Nuk puk 1 +

e
cu
k
Nuk   1
  
wcuk=c
u
k

,
where Nuk  suk   suk 1. Using the previous expression and iterating, it is then easy to check that
the expected cost of producing unit u is given by
pun =
nPn
k=1
hQ
k0>k e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i 
e
cu
k
Nuk   1
  
wcuk=c
u
k
o.
n.
The rest of our proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that Cu is not weakly increasing. Then
there must exist k0 2 f1; :::; n  1g and c > c0 such that cuk0 = c and cuk0+1 = c0. Suppose, in
addition, that Nuk0 = s
u
k0
  suk0 1  suk0+1  suk0 = Nuk0+1. The other case can be treated in a similar
manner. Now consider an alternative allocation of stages to countries, eCu, in which country c0
produces all stages from suk0 1 to s
u
k0
and c produces all stages from suk0+1 Nk0 to suk0+1. The rest
of the allocation of stages to countries is the same as in Cu. Let epun denote the expect unit cost of
the nal good associated with eCu:
epun = nPk0 1k=1 hQk0>k ecuk0Nuk0iecukNuk   1  wcuk=cuk
+
h
e
cNuk0
Q
k0>k0+1 e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i
e
c0Nuk0+1   1

(wc0=c0)
+
hQ
k0>k0+1 e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i 
e
cNuk0   1

(wc=c)
+
Pn
k>k0+1
hQ
k0>k e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i 
e
cu
k
Nuk   1
  
wcuk=c
u
k
o.
en
where, by construction, we must have en  n. Under perfect competition, we know that unit costs
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of production must be minimized. Thus we must have epun  pun. Since en  n, this further requiresh
e
cNuk0
Q
k0>k0+1 e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i
e
c0Nuk0+1   1

(wc0=c0) +
hQ
k0>k0+1 e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i 
e
cNuk0   1

(wc=c)

hQ
k0>k0 e
cu
k0
Nu
k0
i 
e
cNuk0   1

(wc=c) +
hQ
k0>k0+1 e
uck0N
u
k0
i 
e
c0Nuk0+1   1

(wc0=c0) ,
which simplies into wc0  (c0=c)wc > wc. But if the previous inequality holds, then starting
from the allocation Cu, the cost of producing unit u could be strictly lowered by performing all
tasks in
 
suk0 1; s
u
k0+1

in country c: it reduces the rate of mistakes, it reduces wages, and it reduces
the number of international transactions. Since unit costs must be minimized in any competitive
equilibrium, we have established, by contradiction, that Cu is increasing in s for all u 2 0; QW .
QED.
Proof of Lemma 5. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: In any free trade equilibrium, if Ac < Lc, then Ac0 = 0 for all c0 > c.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist c0 > c such that Ac0 > 0 and Ac < Lc.
Since the production function for the nal good, F , is identical across countries, zero prots in the
nal good sector and Ac0 > 0 require wc  wc0 . Since c0 < c, the unit cost of production of any
intermediate good in any chain is then lower in country c0 than in country c, thereby contradicting
Ac < Lc.
Step 2: In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages S0  0  S1  :::  SC = S
such that for all n 2 N , s 2 S, and c 2 C, Qnc (s) > 0 if and only if s 2 (Sc 1; Sc].
Using the same argument as in Lemma 1, one can easily show that for all n 2 N , there exist
Sn0  0  Sn1  :::  SnC = S such that for all s 2 S and c 2 C, Qnc (s) > 0 if and only if
s 2 (Snc 1; Snc ]. Let us now show that for all n; n0 2 N and c 2 C, Snc = Sn
0
c . We proceed by
contradiction. Suppose, without loss of generality, that there exist n; n0; c such that Snc < Sn
0
c . Let
c1  inf
n
c 2 CjSnc < Sn
0
c
o
, c2  inf

c0  c1jSnc0 > Snc1
	
, and   min

Sn
0
c1   Snc ; Snc2   Snc

. By
construction, c1 produces all intermediate goods s 2 (Snc ; Snc +] in chain n0, whereas c2 produces
all intermediate goods s 2 (Snc ; Snc +] in chain n. Thus for all  2 (0;], condition (2) implies
pn
0
(Snc + ) = e
c1pn
0
(Snc ) +

ec1   1

(wc1=c1) ,
pn (Snc + ) = e
c2pn (Snc ) +

ec2   1

(wc2=c2) ,
pn
0
(Snc + )  ec2pn
0
(Snc ) +

ec2   1

(wc2=c2) ,
pn (Snc + )  ec1pn (Snc ) +

ec1   1

(wc1=c1) ,
where pn () and pn0 () represent the price of intermediate goods in chains n and n0, respectively.
By denition of c1, we know that pn (Snc ) = p
n0 (Snc )  pc. Thus the four previous conditions imply
ec1 (pc + wc1=c1)  ec2 (pc + wc2=c2) + (wc2=c2)  (wc1=c1) = 0.
Since the previous equation holds for all  2 (0;], c1 6= c2 implies pc + wc1=c1 = pc + wc2=c2
= 0, which contradicts wc1 ; wc2 > 0.
Lemma 5 follows directly from Steps 1 and 2. QED.
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Proof of Lemma 1 with heterogeneous stages. Following the exact same strategy as in the
proof of Lemma 1, one can easily show that p () is continuous and strictly increasing in s and that
wc is strictly increasing in c. Let us now show that if c2 > c1 and Qc1 (s1) > 0, then Qc2 (s) = 0 for
all s < s1. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two countries, c2 > c1, and two
intermediate goods, s1 > s2 > 0, such that c1 produces s1 and c2 produces s2. Prot maximization
now requires
p (s1) = [1 + c1 (s1) ds] p (s1   ds) + wc1ds,
p (s2) = [1 + c2 (s2) ds] p (s2   ds) + wc2ds,
p (s1)  [1 + c2 (s1) ds] p (s1   ds) + wc2ds,
p (s2)  [1 + c1 (s2) ds] p (s2   ds) + wc1ds.
Combining the four previous expressions, we get
f[1 + c2 (s1) ds] p (s1   ds) + wc2dsg f[1 + c1 (s2) ds] p (s2   ds) + wc1dsg
 f[1 + c1 (s1) ds] p (s1   ds) + wc1dsg f[1 + c2 (s2) ds] p (s2   ds) + wc2dsg ,
which can be rearranged as
[1 + c2 (s1) ds] [p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds)]wc1
 [1 + c1 (s2) ds] [p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds)]wc2
+ [c1 (s1) + c2 (s2)  c2 (s1)  c1 (s2)] p (s2   ds) p (s1   ds)
Since c(s) is weakly submodular in (s; c), c2 > c1 and s1 > s2 imply c1 (s1)+c2 (s2) c2 (s1) 
c1 (s2)  0. Thus the previous inequality implies
[1 + c2 (s1) ds] [p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds)]wc1 (60)
 [1 + c1 (s2) ds] [p (s1   ds)  p (s2   ds)]wc2
Since p (s) is strictly increasing in s, we know that p (s1   ds)   p (s2   ds) > 0. Thus inequality
(60) further implies
[1 + c2 (s1) ds]wc1  [1 + c1 (s2) ds]wc2 . (61)
Finally, since c (s) is strictly decreasing in c and weakly increasing in s, c2 > c1 and s1 > s2
imply c2 (s1) < c1 (s2). Inequality (61) therefore implies wc1 > wc2 , which contradicts wc strictly
increasing in c. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and omitted. QED.
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